The Italian Ministry of Culture has been undertaking substantial reforms in the last decades, aimed at reorganizing both the museum sector and the local branches of the Ministry, the Superintendence system. By reconstructing the genealogy of these reforms from a management study perspective, the paper points out the overall misunderstanding of human resource issues in their design and implementation. Starting from the Pompeii reform in 1997 up to the Franceschini reform in 2014-2016, the authors focus on the main inconsistencies, omissions and mistakes undermining the effectiveness of change processes. The 'original sin' of museum reforms in Italy, mainly due the predominance of a legislative approach and the lack of a management perspective by the ministerial apparatus and law makers, calls for a new approach in organizational and HR terms.
Introduction: a takeover in professional jurisdiction?
The Italian national museum system is currently undergoing a reform with the alleged intent to radically change its structure and functioning. The reform is based on a number of new laws, decrees and regulations modifying the organizational structure, governance, accounting and financial rules of the ministerial bodies in charge of cultural heritage, and includes the selection of new directors through an international competition for 30 newly-autonomous museums. A large debate among professionals, researchers and politicians surrounds the reform, yet without adequately placing it in the historical context of previous reforms, along with their unsolved problems, contradictions and limits. 1 1 What is now the Ministry (MiBACT, Ministry of Cultural Goods and Activities, and Tourism) has been continuously reformed since it was created in 1975. Reconstructing the whole picture would require, if not deserve, an entire book. That reforms can be implemented effectively with such a rate of change -a total of 25 ministries in the period -is open to discussion.
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alternative funding: yet not a single employee was fired, nor the previous contracts changed. The risk is that organizations have scarce resources to spend creating quality activities, apart from paying salaries.
The above provides a very brief context for the international reader to understand the complex and often conflicted evolution of the reforms of Italian national (i.e. State run) museums.
The original sin or the imprinting bias
The basic assumption of this paper is that the shortcomings of the current reform are related to its initial imprinting: a process that was totally unable to learn from earlier mistakes and limitations from a managerial point of view. Unfortunately, this is a quite internally consistent evolution across the various steps of the reforms, which we will try to disentangle in the next section:
a. the continual debate prior to 1997; b. the initial reform of Pompeii (law 1997), with major internal contradictions that were never solved; c. the early enlargement of (part of) the Pompeii reform to include a few large museums, the so- In the whole process, the issue of human resources and the crucial issue of organization of labour are left behind. Sometimes these issues are seen as boring, bureaucratic consideration, in conflicting with the more academic content of the curator's job.
2 Sometime the innovation introduced -as seen in the case of Pompeii in 1997 -the lack of innovation in terms of human resource management ends up with perverse mechanisms, as we will show. In all cases, one of the biggest surprises of the "new directors" was probably the realisation that they were not expectednor had the responsibility, powers and tools -to manage the staff of the museums. Their professional experience echoes that of the first "city manager" in Pompeii, who suddenly realized that his arrival was the only change in the whole organization of labour, and found he was not able to take his team and trusted collaborators with him.
Optimists may say that this is a gradual process, and things will change and improve in the future. Our view is more disenchanted: nothing improved in the past two decades. The Pompeii reform itself was set up explicitly as an "experiment", but nothing really was done to improve the experiment and resolve its intrinsic limitations and contradictions, and all the weakness of the original law continued to affect the extension of the "innovation" to the museum hubs and further reforms.
Reconstructing the genealogy of reforms from a management study perspective
In this section we will revisit the various steps inside the lawmaking process in the Italian national museums and local branches of the Ministry, in order to support our critique of the lack of managerial understanding.
a) The debate prior to 1997
The Italian cultural heritage system has traditionally been based on a strictly centralized and hierarchical model (D'Alessio, 1992; Bobbio, 1992) . Within this model, the Ministry for Cultural
Heritage is responsible for protection on all national heritage (both public and private property) and for the direct management of all state-owned cultural assets (including the most important archaeological sites and museums such as Pompeii, the Uffizi and the Gallerie dell'Accademia in Venice and the Pinacoteca di Brera in Milan) through a capillary set of local branches of the Ministry called Superintendencies. The Superintendencies were divided by sector (one for archaeology, fine arts, architecture etc. in each territory, usually one or more in each of the provinces) are non-autonomous peripheral entities, and depended on the central Ministry in Rome for all scientific, organizational economic and financial issues, including personnel. On their own, the national museums and archaeological sites were mere offices of the Superintendencies, often even without a specific Director in charge of their management (Zan 1999; Paolucci 1996) .
There is a huge tradition of debate and discussion about the reforms of the whole system, and major museums within them. Many contributions provide an interesting reconstruction over decades (e.g. Bobbio 1993; Cammelli 1996; Mottola Molfino 1998; Petraroia 1998 . Also worth noting are the round table on "Reforms and decentralization in reality", on the new journal Aedon on 1998, and the contribution herein by Ainis, Bobbio, Cammelli, and Sciullo) .
It is interesting to note how the whole debate refers tacitly to bigger museums and sites (Pompeii, Brera, Uffizi etc.), those that are expected to be able to be self-sufficient; candidates for self-funding given their status and dimension. In other words, there is already a misunderstanding in 5 the whole debate -that managerial reforms make sense only when entities are "profitable", or can at least break even. The fact that the British Museum, for example, is well or badly managed, but in any case survives without entrance fees and thus without any potential of breaking even was totally ignored by Italian experts and politicians of the time. More specifically, any notion of accountability and responsibility was completely foreign to the debate prior to 1997.
b) The initial reform of Pompeii (1997)
The introduction of the new law was supported by a persistent advertising campaign by the Superintendency of Pompeii, which included the publication of the Plan for Pompeii (MIBACT, SAP and WMF, 1997) , addressing the need to stop the decay of the site, which would have required ten years and 250 million euros. In parallel to this important document by leading archaeologists, an administrative reform of the Superintendency was carried out. Despite the fact it was advertised as a crucial innovation, a sort of social laboratory on an experimental basis for the whole sector of cultural goods, directly supported by the Vice Prime Minister, the reform of Pompeii is structured very simply in one article of a broader law (Zan 1998 (Zan /2002 Ferri and Zan 2014) . 3 Some important innovations were introduced, most importantly the idea of an autonomous Superintendency:
1. A Board of Director was set up: rather than relying on the single figure of the Superintendent as had been the case in the past (and still is in many other Superintendencies), the three-member
Board created the new position of a "city manager" (in addition to the Superintendent, and the oldest professional in the site). This figure was seen as an empowered financial director:
curiously enough, given that accounting and administration are not very sexy labels in Italy, the press and the ministry referred to the position using the English term ("city managers", which normally referred to the general manager of the administration of municipalities, a quite different position). Furthermore, the position could be covered by a temporary contract, which meant hiring people from the private sector. This was the first time that the Ministry opened the door to senior officials not drawn from within the ministerial body and selected by national examinations.
2. A central innovation was that ticket revenue could now be kept by the Pompeii entity. 4 Before the introduction of the reform, the ticket was a tax collected at the periphery (the Superintendency), then transferred to the centre (the Ministry in Rome), which then allocated 6 resources to various peripheral entities according to an internal administrative logic. There was no relation between ticket revenue and eventual allocations. The reform introduced a strong incentive mechanism, and the ticket -now legally redefined as service offset -could be kept at Pompeii to cover costs, including the costs of restoration and conservation. More tickets would mean better opportunities for recovering Pompeii from decay. If the innovation was important in terms of procedure, in substantive terms that also meant a huge increase of resources for Pompeii, from the original 3 million per year allocated by the Ministry to 25 or more million from tickets sales -a big difference! 3. For the first time, a form of accountability was introduced. Pompeii, as an autonomous entity, was required to present a sort of financial report, where all cash transfers were presented and accounted for, revenues as well as expenditures. This solved one of the common problems of Italian public sector museums, that are usually considered simply "non organizations", parts of a higher entity, in this case the Ministry. Also, this provided increased transparency in the use of different revenue sources which heretofore were accounted for individually, but were now included in a single annual report.
But. There was a huge 'but' in the whole 1997 reform. Human resources were not included.
The responsibility for human resource management was kept at the Ministry level. Hiring, career progression, firing -all human resource issues -would continue to be managed at the central level, But much more than making the balance sheet not transparent, this decision hid a very crucial but perverse mechanism in the law. The law meant there was no incentive for reviewing the 7 organization of labour (sorely needed in institutions that have been around for centuries). 5 No way to deal with "make or buy" choices, or for redefining the boundaries of the organization though process of in and outsourcing. For instance, if there were the possibility to provide cleaning through buying a service from the outside rather than using internal employees, this would not be possible.
Getting rid of unnecessary labour costs -assuming that one could really do it -would only benefit the financial situation of the Ministry, while any new services would be charged to the Pompeii, consequently reducing resources for conservation. In this sense, the so-called managerial reform of
Pompeii was contradictory, unfinished, and "crippled" as it was referred to in jargon. It is easy to predict, if misstaffing causing inability to spend was a major issue at the time, (Zan 1998) , that it would continue to be a problem in the future.
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It is interesting to introduce here another anecdotal element. A few month after the promulgation of the new law in November 1997, one of the authors of this paper was writing the first analysis on the Pompeii reform (Zan 1998 (Zan /2002 during a visit at Warwick University, in
March/April 1998, following the fieldwork done between November and March. This was really at the early stage of the new regime, with the first "city manager" having just been appointed (March 1998). As is often the case when you do research, when you start writing you piece together the puzzle using the bits of information, documents, interviews etc., until the whole picture starts to take shape. At that stage, the issue of the contradictory, crippled reform emerged. To double check, the author called the Superintendent, who was surprised by this interpretation, and told him to speak with the city manager, who suddenly realized the contradiction in the law, and the need to ask for changes. It would have been simply a matter of three words, to "finish" the reform, and make it consistent with a managerial logic. Despite his efforts, the law was never changed. The 'original sin' -the lack of control of human resources and the organization of labour -is still in place.
Mistakes are possible, certainly, even in lawmaking, and it is hard to believe than someone would be so perfidious as to "plan" such a bad law. Nonetheless, despite the declared "experimental" nature of the law, the intrinsic mistake would never be resolved, and to be honest, with hindsight, one might doubt that anybody inside the Ministry ever even understood the point! c) Enlarging the reform: the "Museum hubs" The analysis of the implementation of this mitigated autonomy conducted by one of the authors in the Venetian Museum Hub draws attention to this and other relevant issues (Bonini Baraldi 2007 . Since its very transformation from "Historical, artistic, and demo-ethnoanthropologic Superintendency of Venice" (the territorial sectorial Superintendency) to the "Venetian Museum Hub", what immediately emerged was the need for new skills, both in quantitative and qualitative terms. This was clear, given that the management of museums, compared to the preservation of the territorial heritage, brings with it unprecedented duties (such as the calculations of the museums guards salaries and corollary incentives). 8 The "Museum Hub"
project was ambitious in itself, calling for new curatorial (for the artistic direction of the museums) and managerial skills (for the financial reporting and the new accounting system). Yet, due to the 7 Gherpelli himself (the first city manager of Pompeii), declared that "the autonomy conceived for Pompeii has a clear instrumental meaning: it is a tool to obtain testable and theoretically extensible results" (Gherpelli 1999: 1) , and underlined the need to "eliminate as soon as possible the limits already visible in the law, which suffers of too many compromises. The law can be modified, we believe that it should" (Gherpelli 1999: 7) . In general, the first years of mitigated autonomy in the Museum Hubs were very difficult
and contradictory: what emerges is a partial autonomy, characterised both by the intrinsic limits of the instruments introduced (and already evident in the experiment of Pompeii); the enormous difficulties in its implementation; and an ambiguous political "strategy". In the meantime, the Museums Hubs remained stuck in an ambitious project without personnel, resources and future.
According to a quick update with the Venetian Museum Hub, the following years have not been better: as the Administrative Director affirms (14 January 2007) "unfortunately not much has changed. Human resources remain the biggest problem. With fewer and fewer people, managed for the most part centrally, without incentives and therefore demotivated, is really difficult to follow the road of autonomy, which becomes a daily battle".
d) The tacit dismantlement of the Pompeii reform innovations
Bad things can get worse. This is a short summary of what happened to the Pompeii reform after its introduction: the dismantlement/removal of a crippled reform (on these aspects see extensively None of the City Managers, in any case, felt the need to present a report on their mandate (as no doubt, no procedure required them to do so). -Second, the revenues were not left totally to the site forever. Soon 30% was appropriated annually by the Ministry (since 2006), in order to better subsidize the financial needs of other sites and museums. This was a second attack on the core of the reform, showing a total disregard for the logic of responsibility that underlined the reform (albeit not totally consistently). Moreover, on two occasions the Ministry took away part of the savings of the site -cash amounts that were left temporarily due to a persistent inability to spend them -and used them for other sites (€30 million in 2006 and €40 million in 2008). That was the third attack: taking resources away from the site, despite the logic of autonomous management. At this point, it is not clear who can be considered responsible for what. After ten years, and receiving the funding, was the recovery of Pompeii -called for by the Plan for Pompeii in 1997, and the call for €250 million Euro over a period of 10 years -reached or not? Who was responsible, given the distortion of part of the "agreed upon" resources? In any case, nobody ever had to write a report related to the plan for Pompeii to answer any of these questions! -Third, in 2008 the Superintendence of Pompeii was merged with that of Naples, which was in very poor financial shape, with the result that the tickets for Pompeii were funding the desperate lack of funds of in Naples, rather than the site itself, once again calling into question the entire system of responsibility and accountability that was foreseen by the law.
-Last but not least, in July 2008 the autonomy was suspended, centralizing it directly under a Commissioner that who directly reported to the Prime Ministry, replacing the Board of Directors, within a sort of client/patron relationship.
13 After a few months, in February 2009, the first commissioner was fired without any public explanation, and a second one was appointed.
One year later, in June 2010 the Court of Accounts (Corte dei Conti, 2010) declared that this extraordinary administration was illegal, so the situation went back to its starting point, back to what was left of the reform.
The whole sense of the (already crippled) reform from a management point of view was seriously threatened. From a substantive point of view, it is interesting to notice that serious problems of the inability to spend were still in place. When a generous amount of money was provided in conjunction with the European Community (Franceschini, 2015) for a radical attempt to solve Pompeii's decay, there was a serious risk that money would have to be given back because of the inability to spend the €105 million within the mandatory 3 years of the grant (Osser 2014; Fantuzzi and Sironi 2015) . Only the generosity of the funders, who accepted an extension of the period, prevented this from taking place. Therefore, despite the reform, and its dismantling in different forms, the commissario etc. many bad things did not change at all.
e) The Franceschini reform
More recently, some important innovations have been introduced by the so-called "Franceschini reform" (in the name of the Minister in charge from 2014 to 2018), following some previous changes. 14 By its nature, the system of Superintendencies -the local branches of the Ministry -was coupling responsibilities of protection of national heritage with direct involvement in the running of national museums and sites. In a sense separating these two main aspects, the reform aimed at 13 It is impossible to translate the term "Commissario" in English, given the different administrative traditions. This is a sort of extraordinary administration, often used in case of natural disaster to coordinate intervention in emergency case. During the last two decades, this has been overused in many situations, including the art sector (e.g. Opera houses). See At the peripheral level, the reform changed the role of the Superintendencies, while establishing new entities: autonomous museums, regional museum hubs and regional secretariats (ministerial decree n. 44 23/01/2016). Superintendencies are now responsible only for the protection of cultural heritage but not for its management and enhancement, as it was in the past. 15 In parallel, the new national museum system was structured into two main groups. A first group is composed of thirty so-called "autonomous museums" (twenty museums as of 2014 and a further ten as of 2016), in charge of the management and enhancement of their own heritage and collections (only the most important museums of the country are included in this list). A second group is made up of seventeen "regional museum hubs", in charge of all national non-autonomous museums and heritage sites in their region, plus all other public or private museums, through ad hoc agreements. 16 Regional secretariats replaced regional directorates, with the aim to coordinate territorial Superintendencies and to cooperate with local authorities and other institutions in the region.
In a sense, this reform explicitly attempted to solve the most critical issues in the museum system providing the conditions for more effective management: it required the adoption of a set of minimum museum standards; it underlined the need for specific professional profiles, and defined the functions to be performed within each museum (direction/management; collections care and management, study, research and educational activities; marketing, fund raising, services to the public and PR; administration, finance and HRM; structures, exhibits and security: DM 23/12/2014). 17 In addition, each museum (autonomous or part of the regional museum hub) should have its own statute, charter of services, and budget. 18 The thirty most important museums gained . 19 In our opinion however, none of these debates really tackled the heart of the problem: the inability of the reform to address the neverending problem of human resources. Actually, the notion of autonomy used in the reform is purely juridical, and extremely misleading when translating it in the vocabulary of international management studies. Following the tradition from Pompeii's reform onward, the new directors do not have any decision-making power with regards selection and hiring/firing/managing human resources within their organization. At most they can make proposals about staffing (Forte, 2015) , but the related regulation has not been changed and still depends on ministerial norms and decrees.
To make the situation even more bizarre, a further event related to human resource issues when an open competition to hire 500 new senior staff for the whole ministerial apparatus was launched (the first after decades of a hiring freeze). 20 Curiously enough, the call completely ignored skills and profiles related to the functions established by the reform itself, and did not include any
Association on an experimental base. The Report was first experimented in 5 ministerial structures -3 autonomous museums and 3 regional museum hubs, for a total amount of 26 entities. 19 On this matter, the Regional Administrative Court has already rendered 16 decisions and the State Council other 6, but the final decision has not yet been taken. 20 It has been noticed that when the reform was launched the average age of ministerial personnel was 55 years old (Casini, 2017 Not surprisingly, what emerges from a quick review of the selected candidates is that the humanistic, artistic-historical profile still prevails. Moreover, some of the candidates for the "promotion and communication" profile took part in the same competition for different posts, for instance as art historians or archaeologists. This might hide the fact that the "promotion and communication officer" profile is still considered a second-best choice.
In addition to this, the special role of ALES spa has to be pointed out. ALES spa is an inhouse company of the Ministry, founded in 1997, and from 2016 incorporating also ARCUS spa (another ministerial company), whose role is to support the Ministry of Culture in a variety of functions, such as management and enhancement of cultural heritage, administrative and legal tasks etc. One possible answer for the omission of administrative and managerial profiles in the call for new staff could lie in the fact that, for the moment, the Ministry "prefers" such tasks to be externalised and carried out by ALES staff, to whom it resorts at both at the central and peripheral level. In this regard, some criticism has emerged, also by using ALES the Ministry appears to bypass some administrative and financial constraints. 22 ALES was in fact also subject of a parliamentary investigation.
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Relevant problems also emerged with regards to the new peripheral organizational structure, for instance the hierarchical relationships between the new roles of regional secretary, regional museum hub director and autonomous museum director (Cammelli 2016; Cammelli, Piperata, Sciullo, Sau 2016) and the relative distribution of personnel (OECD 2016).
In short, despite some encouraging results in terms of museum visitors (+31% from 2013 to 2017) which may be due to external factors such as increased tourism to Italy, and improved financial performance (+53% in income from 2013 to 2017) which could be attributed to changing ticketing policy, the crucial issue of human resources was once again neglected by the Franceschini reform, and the 'original sin' still in place. It could be argued that the problem was already present earlier in the process: designing a reform, planning its organizational implications and providing the adequate instruments for its implementation is after all a matter of human resources. Radically put, the issue of human resource management requires forms of knowledge that relate not merely to (Italian) legislation, but above all, to the knowledge developed internationally within the field of management studies. In this sense, the Franceschini reform confirmed once again the dominance of the legislative discourse in the Italian context (Cassese 1999; Panozzo 2000; Zan 2006 ; Bonini Baraldi 2014).
Concluding remarks for a policy/research agenda
The reconstruction of the lack of understanding of human resource management in the whole debate about the reform of national heritage entities (as seen from the "genealogy" of reform, from
Pompeii to the Franceschini reform, which show astonishing degrees of "internal consistency") provides a picture that could be summarized in the following terms: -the dominance of legal approach and an abnormal role played by law making;
-the radical lack of understanding by Italian law makers of any notion of management, even public sector management, as developed internationally, and its basic issue of autonomy (as defined in the management vocabulary), accountability, responsibility and similar best practices; -the inaccuracy of law making, with several "mistakes" made during the process (from the initial forgetting of human resources in the Pompeii law, to the bizarre case of museum hubs and the inconsistencies with the first version of the Urbani code); -the inherent 'laziness' of law making: Pompeii was presented as an experiment -twenty years later the main internal inconsistencies of the law have still not been solved.
If these elements explain many problems of the Italian public sector transformation, when considering human resources another element enters into play, possibly worsening the situation: the protectionist approach to public employment, in which the dominance of the legislative process creates a fertile ground. The issue of human resource management is simply ignored in the legislative reforms, as if it were a secondary issue. Behind this omission, however, there is much more than simple inattention: there is a clear will to avoid touching longstanding vested interests. A neo-liberal view is far from our position, yet without approaching, debating and finding sustainable solutions for human resource and organizational issues, any reform of the heritage system will be largely meaningless.
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The reconstruction of events and the interpretation of this paper aims at addressing some crucial questions for the future, both for a policy making and a research agenda. Is decentralization seriously to be taken into account, and if so, how it will incorporate the issue of human resource management? Is responsibility a notion that will be fully acknowledged in the process of administrative transformation or not? And what about achieving consistent forms of accountability?
Unless these questions are addressed with honesty, courage and intelligence, the risk is that future reforms will continue to share the flaws of those in the past, and, as a consequence, be doomed to failure in the medium-to-long term.
